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Heidegger's frequent claim concerning the oblivion of Being raises the idea of oblivion as a 
symptom; the symptom of philosophy. Thinking of oblivion as a symptom requires its 
consideration as a formation of the unconscious, that which is simultaneously being disclosed 
and concealed by language. 
The primary concern of the present lecture will rest on two known claims regarding the 
relation between language and Being; one is Heidegger's claim relating Being to the place in 
which it dwells: 'Language is the house of Being', and the other is psychoanalysis' supposition 
of the Subject as a 'speaking being' (parle être). The Subject's being dwells in language, and 
this appears in Lacan's oft quoted saying that 'the unconscious is structured like a language'.  
So what precisely does it mean that oblivion is the symptom of philosophy? The use of the 
psychoanalytic premise regarding the symptom as structured by language has significant 
implications to this effect. The crucial implication being that as a symptom, oblivion does not 
signify a hidden illness. Oblivion does not mean that there is something 'wrong' with 
philosophy and that 'something' should be fixed or cured in it - so that philosophy may stop 
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forgetting and exist in the realm of pure remembering. That is, philosophy's oblivion of its 
core question, the question of Being, is structural. This means that as a symptom it may seem 
contingent but its constant repetition reveals it as unavoidable, a 'solution' which philosophy 
cannot but be 'pushed' towards upon encountering the structural impossibility of the question 
of Being.  
  A Symptom
1. The entanglement of Being and language which creates oblivion as its symptom 
requires that we first articulate what the symptom is; following Freud, Lacan's 
understanding of the symptom is in linguistic terms: 'The symptom resolves itself 
entirely in an analysis of language, because the symptom is itself structured like a 
language'. P0 F1 P This definition of the symptom is crucial because it defines the symptom 
in its relation to the structure (of language) rather than in terms of surface and depth; 
the symptom isn’t the perceptible manifestation of a hidden illness (as it is referred to 
by medicine for example) but is a formation of the unconscious. As such, the 
symptom cannot or actually should not be treated as one which can simply be 
removed or 'hushed up' since it is a product of the Subject's (parle être) particular 
encounter with language. It cannot be conceived of as pre-pared set of neurosis 
indexed and catalogued, for it is constructed as such by the Subject's speech; the 
Subject speaks his symptom but he doesn’t know what he says by it. Indeed, it is the 
dialectic of analysis that constructs the symptom as such.P1F2P Therefore, the symptom is 
an enigmatic and opaque message delivered to the Other which neither the Other nor 
the Subject himself know what is being 'delivered' by it. This Subject possesses an 
object of knowledge that he does not know how to know and this not knowing how to 
know binds the Subject's being to language. As such, the Subject’s being is not 
present in what the Subject as speaker says, since the ego or the "I" is not the only 
authority that determines the Subject's being. It is for this reason that psychoanalysis 
reveals the existence of a structural split between what the Subject knows or says 
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concerning being and being 'itself', a split that is embodied in the very fact of 
speaking.  
The symptom, which is structured like a language, represents the unbearable for the Subject. 
It constitutes a solution, an unconscious and a failed one, for an impossible kernel of the 
Subject's psychic life; the impossibility to bear being (se faire a être).P2F3P  
Being  and LanguageU 
We know by now that it is the interweaving of language with Being that unavoidably creates 
oblivion as a symptom. To this effect I turn us to Heidegger's claim that: 'We are within 
language, at home in language, prior to everything else.'P3F4P which raises the question of why we 
need to find our way to language? as he demands from us.   
We will need to recall Heidegger's discussion of idle talk in order to try and answer this 
question.P4F5 P Idle talk conceals from the Dasein 'the word's primordial belongingness to Being'. P5F6P 
This concealment necessitates a way. But, at the same time, the concealment of 'the word's 
primordial belongingness to Being' appears as unavoidable, since Dasein is thrown to the 
discourse of idle talk (as we all are). 'Language is the house of Being', Heidegger writes there 
and it is the belongingness of the word to Being that is being concealed from Dasein. But this 
concealment 'is peculiar to language […] itself' as he will write later.P6F7P We therefore remain in 
need of way to language that will unveil this very fact of concealment. Thus, the always- 
already being- at-home in language is a formulation that actually unveils our being guests. In 
other words it unveils the ontological fact of our being-at-home (in language) as semblance. 
Relative to the discursive mode of idle talk, Being appears a guest in language, a guest which 
overly feels at home, a guest who isn’t aware of his status as such. It is Heidegger's demand 
of a way to language that reminds us of our being guests, reminds us of the primordial fact 
that constitutes us; our being 'within language, at home in language, prior to everything else.'P7F8P  
The way, which is to say, the state of being in need of formulating a way, attests to the 
discontent that is built-in into our 'being at home' in language (we may add, in being 'at home' 
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in general), a discontent that idle talk aims unconsciously to hush up. It appears that to be at-
home is actually to be a guest without knowing it. And it is Heidegger who tells us: 
 
'Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of Being. Because of it the truth of Being remains 
unthought […]. This homelessness is specifically evoked from the destiny of Being in the 
form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously entrenched and covered up 
as such.'P8F9P 
Homelessness as symptom can be explicated also in light of the way in which Heidegger 
draws the primordial status of the mood of 'uncanniness' in its relation to the mood of the 'at-
homeness': 'From an existential-ontological point of view, the "not at-home" must be 
conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.'.P9F10P Heidegger emphasizes that despite its 
primordiallity, 'uncanniness' is a mood that is left concealed, forgotten from us who mostly 
lacks an ontological understanding of it.P10F11P Moreover, as primordial mood, uncanniness draws 
the impossibility of the "at-homeness" for it discloses the being 'at-home' as semblance that in 
the greater context of  Being and Time protect Dasein from another primordial mood, that of 
anxiety.P11F12 
The ontological primordiality of uncanniness, 'whether it is understood or not', actually 
transgresses the possibility of Being to dwell in language, unless we consider the 'dwelling' as 
embodied through and through by the subverting status of 'being a guest'. Meaning, the 
always-already dwelling in idle talk, the embodiment of 'being at-home' is not the Other pole 
of uncanniness. Idle talk which represents the being at-home as semblance is a structural and 
necessary blindness for protecting us from anxiety. Protecting us from the fact of our being 
guests: 'That kind of Being-in-the-world [everyday manner] which is tranquillized and 
familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse'. P12F13P  
The primordiality of the mood of uncanniness is embodied in the primordiality of the 
discourse of silence. This primordiality to which we are thrown is interweaved through and 
through in the projective function of language. But it is this projective function of language 
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(as house, as that of 'being-at-home') which creates a split between Being and 'itself' ; a split 
which is rooted in the very fact of speech. This fact locates Being within the liminal topos of 
language, as a conditional resident, that is, a guest. The unbearabiliy of this ontological fact 
that is disguised by being at-home pushes us to forget. It means that to dwell in language is 
nothing but to dwell in oblivion.  
Oblivion of Being
The fact of our being a guest in language is the cause of the split between Being and 
language, a split which is structural and inherently present in the Heideggerian dictum: 'what 
is peculiar to language thus conceals itself'.P13F14P The persisting testimony of this split is the very 
fact of oblivion. Therefore, oblivion cannot be negated on the basis of the relation between 
Being and language.  
Within the context of psychoanalytic thought that may offer us an explication of oblivion as 
an unavoidable symptom, namely as what enables, from the start to ask the question of Being, 
let us consider Lacan's words in Seminar 17 in this light: 'The lack of forgetting is the same 
thing as the lack in being, since being is nothing other than forgetting.'P14F15P  
This puzzling citation refers to something that goes against our "intuitive" understanding 
regarding the relation between Being and its oblivion; here, being appears as identical to 
forgetting. But if we are to return to Heidegger's claim concerning the oblivion of Being we 
are required rather to remember. The equation of forgetfulness and being as it is referred by 
Lacan undermines this understanding; since 'being is forgetting', namely, its necessary 
consequence is the subversion of thinking about remembering and forgetting as opposing 
terms. Within the psychoanalytic context, (as well as within the Heideggerian context) we 
always-already dwell in forgetfulness, and as such we always already dwell in Being 'since 
being is nothing other than forgetting'.     
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If being is nothing but forgetting, it cannot be forgotten, we may say it is unforgettable. If so, 
the modes of Being's oblivion are the only ones that enable some accessibility to it. We may 
think of this in recalling Freud's claim when he writes about the analytic scene:  
 
'Forgetting impressions, scenes or experiences nearly always reduce itself to shutting them 
off. When the patient talks about these 'forgotten' things he seldom fails to add: "As a matter 
of fact I've always known it; only I've never thought of it."'P15F16P 
Remembering appears to be realized in what could not be forgotten from the start; in the 
always-already known and yet the un-thought of. Therefore if we think of remembering, we 
are, in effect, remembering the repressed that which could not be forgotten. Indeed we must 
acknowledge that the repression, as well as the forgotten, is actually a form of 
remembrance. 'The forgotten' enables the construction of remembering ('I've always known 
it; only I've never thought of it'). Notice, the object that is remembered necessitates its being 
constructed, as that which cannot appear without the linguistic articulation, without the 
signifier.    
Forgetfulness, it would seem, does not 'disappear' when replaced by remembering, but rather 
testifies the split within Being, within the known and the un-thought of. To know without 
thinking of the known is to forget. And to forget means nothing but to-be. P16F17P  
As represented within the psychoanalytic context, remembering actually serves as an 
affirmation of Being in the form of its denial, in the form of its oblivion. That is, it represents 
the place in which the Subject of the unconscious does not identify himself. Being isn’t 
'represented' by language but language appears at the moment it encounters being. It is the 
realm that comes to pass after this encounter which the analytic situation tries to trace.  
There is a structural split between the 'speaking being', the Subject of the signifier (the one 
who remembers, the one whose 'case' is being constructed) and the place of Being. Therefore, 
we may claim that the construction does not bridge this split but draws to the limits of its 
truth: 'a truth that lies in oblivion'. P17F18 P   
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Freud presents the" construction" as a form of articulation for a forgotten chapter in the 
history of the analysand. The construction is not correspondingly a linguistic representation of 
the forgotten content, which neither the analysand nor the analyst has access to, but rather 
functions beforehand as a substitute for what could not have been forgotten ('I've always 
known it; only I've never thought of it'). The always-already known knowledge yet 
unthought-of locates the forgotten as that which cannot come to light without the 
construction.   
It is for this reason that the "construction" in analysis, despite its structural incompleteness 
'should nevertheless produce a complete result' as Freud tells us.19
But what is this 'complete result' which Freud speaks of ? It is that which is analyzed in light 
of the construction's effects; if in proximity to the presentation of the construction by the 
analyst there is an appearance of 'lively recollections […] which they themselves [analysands] 
have described as "ultra-clear"', dreams, 'states resembling fantasies' or day-dreams that relate 
directly or indirectly to the construction's content. In such cases the construction appears 
retroactively as true.P19F20P  Which is to say, the construction's status as true or false is not 
determined by its correspondence to the historical facts, or by the correctness of the analyst's 
interpretations, but only in light of its effects.  
It is the Freudian construction's structure which makes of it the subverting materiality which 
undercuts the dichotomy between the forgotten\ old and the remembered\ new. This 
subversion is crucial when taking into consideration the equivalency between being and 
forgetting, which reveals the 'remembered' as that which is 'always-already' 'there'. The 
undermining of the forgotten/remembered dichotomy drives us towards an understanding of 
the nature of the oblivion of Being. Since, to remember or to recollect the question of Being 
doesn’t demand to invent something new. This clearly echoes Heidegger's formulation of the 
'way' (to language); the 'way' is neither new nor old, it is a way which 'we are already at the 
place to which it is supposed to lead us'.P20F21P A way, to language as well as to the forgotten, 
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which demands of us to approach the saying as Sagan ; that which 'let something appear, let it 
be seen and heard'.P21F22P  
Reading Heidegger's assertion concerning the oblivion of Being in juxtaposition with the 
identity psychoanalysis draws between being and forgetting leads up to these two positions: 
both claiming that being can be dealt with only through its modes of forgetfulness which are 
revealed by language.  
When Heidegger claims that we have forgotten the question of Being he does not ask to exile 
oblivion but to disclose it as such. This is actually what characterizes his mode of 
argumentation when he writes that the way he raises the question of Being asks to be 
distinguished from the 'arrogant presumption that wishes to begin anew and declares all past 
philosophy false'. P22F23 P Meaning, the very raising of the question of Being does not mean to 
negate its oblivion and replace it with remembering, or to refute metaphysics.P23F24P Rather, it 
means to draw or to construct the cause of oblivion with the weight on the operation of 
language that 'already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving'. P24F25P  
If we think of this in conjunction with Freud's concept of 'construction' we may come to see 
how the construction functions as unavoidable substitute for the forgotten, and so it remains. 
Since the construction is an invention which traces a psychic history not a factual history, its 
purpose is to unveil the cause of oblivion and not to function as a corresponding articulation 
of the forgotten. The forgotten, therefore does not disappear, excluded or negated, but rather 
becomes constructed. Freud's description of the structure of the construction as incomplete 
one which at the same time is expected to provide complete results, refers to the forgotten as a 
structural eclipse,  an unavoidable one, which manifests its unavoidability in the relation 
drawn by Heidegger between metaphysics and the oblivion of the question of Being. In one of 
Heidegger's many characterizations of metaphysics he writes that: 'Metaphysics has not only 
failed up to now to ask this question [the question of Being], the question is inaccessible to 
metaphysics as such'. P25F26 P What is meant herein is that metaphysic's structure always-already 
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prevents it from asking the question of Being. Awareness as to the oblivion of Being is 
concealed from metaphysics. However, Heidegger later adds:  
  
'this concealment is not a defect of metaphysics but a treasure withheld from it yet held before 
it, the treasure of its own proper wealth.'27
The structural inability to ask the question of being while simultaneously referring to Being as 
metaphysics' "own proper wealth" directly speaks to the unavoidability of oblivion. An 
unavoidability that reconstructs oblivion as its symptom. Thinking of oblivion as a symptom 
means that Heidegger's claim with regard to the oblivion of being may not refer the possibility 
to remember it. As a symptom, oblivion is nothing but a movement of forced repetition that 
philosophy cannot but constantly repeat.  
  
Indeed, if we consider the symptom as it appears within the psychoanalytic thought; that 
which is not an interruption or an obstacle to an operation of a system but rather, the center of 
the neurotic's complaint, we may come to see how the symptom, how oblivion, 'represents' 
the impossibility of existence  as experienced by the Subject of who asks analysis. Or, in line 
with Freud the symptom is also an invention, an unconscious attempt to handle the 
impossible: a coping mechanism that causes suffer but is also 'surprisingly satisfying' and 
therefore need not be 'removed' or cured but need be done with, need savoir-faire with.    
The oblivion of Being is the invention of philosophy to deal with the structural impossibility 
that arises upon encountering the question of Being. For oblivion, as inherent to philosophy, 
which cannot raise from within it the question of being, has a positive function in the process 
of its becoming. Indeed, it is oblivion that enables the becoming of philosophy, from its very 
start.     
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